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ABSTRACT
There is an increasing trend that enterprises outsource their
network functions to the cloud for lower cost and ease of
management. However, network function outsourcing brings
threats to enterprises’ privacy since the cloud is able to ac-
cess the traffic and rules of in-cloud network functions. Cur-
rent tools for secure network function outsourcing either in-
cur large performance overhead or do not support real-time
updates. In this paper, we present SICS, a secure service
function chain outsourcing framework. SICS encrypts each
packet header and use a label for in-cloud rule matching,
which enables the cloud to perform its functionalities cor-
rectly with minimum header information leakage. Evalua-
tion results show that SICS achieves higher throughput, faster
construction and update speed, and lower resource overhead
at both enterprise and cloud sides, compared to existing so-
lutions.
1. INTRODUCTION
Network functions, also known as middleboxes, are vi-
tal parts of modern networks, ranging from security appli-
ances (e.g. firewalls and intrusion detection systems (ID-
Ses)) to performance boosting devices (e.g. HTTP proxies
and video transcoder). Network policies typically require
packets to go through a sequence of middleboxes [41, 33],
which is called a service function chain [16, 41]. For ex-
ample, all HTTP packets should go through IDS→ Proxy;
packets from an internal site should be processed by NAT →
Firewall. Typical enterprise networks employ a large num-
ber of middleboxes. Reported in a survey on middlebox de-
ployment [36], the total number of various middleboxes ap-
proximates that of L2/L3 switches in enterprise networks.
However, dedicated hardware middleboxes come with high
infrastructure and management costs, which result from their
complex and specialized processing, variations in manage-
ment tools across devices and vendors.
Stimulated by ever increasing computing power of com-
modity hardware, the telecommunication industry has pro-
posed network functions virtualization (NFV) [26, 8, 4, 3],
which attempts to run software middleboxes atop commod-
ity server hardware. On the other hand, growing number
of applications are hosted in the cloud to reap benefits of
it [6, 11, 12]: the statistical multiplexing of hardware re-
sources and hence lower operational cost. Following this
trend, outsourcing middleboxes [34, 23, 28, 29, 17] to the
third-party cloud now seems promising with the emerging
of NFV. Apart from economical advantages, the flexibility
of software and the elasticity of the cloud collectively en-
able the efficient incorporating of traffic fluctuation, whether
stemming from daily pattern or unexpected DDos attacks.
Furthermore, an initial effort [34] indicates that outsourcing
middleboxes can be achieved without performance impact in
terms of latency.
In order to allow the cloud to process traffic, existing mid-
dlebox outsourcing solutions [34, 23] require enterprises to
provide the cloud with the processing rules for each out-
sourced middlebox and to redirect their traffic to the cloud
in plaintext. The imposed privacy issues hinder the wide
adoption of outsourcing middleboxes to the cloud. Network
traffic data are one of the top business secrets of enterprises
and their customers, and most of the enterprise customers
are discouraged by the potential data leakage. Moreover,
the processing rules contain sensitive information (i.e., what
traffic is not welcome to the enterprise), and its leakage would
expose a severe security hole.
Embark [28] resolves the privacy issue of packet head-
ers and rules of outsourced middleboxes. To support prefix
or range match in some network functions (e.g. firewalls),
Embark divides the header space of each field into multiple
sub-intervals, which are randomly mapped to other intervals
for encryption before the packet enters the cloud. How-
ever, the time to build such sub-interval division requires
O(n2logn), where n is the number of rules. The situation
is aggravated if service chaining is taken into consideration,
where the rules in all middleboxes are required to compute
the sub-interval division. Embark does not support real time
rule updates, which are very common in practical networks.
In the worst case, the encryption of all rules needs to be re-
calculated. Moreover, in Embark, field-by-field encryption
of packet headers preserves the order of fields and thus is
vulnerable to brute force attacks.
To address the efficiency and privacy issues of packet header
encryption and rule matching, in this paper, we design and
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implement a middlebox outsourcing scheme SICS, short for
secure in-cloud service chaining. SICS protects the private
information of packet headers and rules by sending pack-
ets with encrypted headers to the cloud. Since encrypted
headers cannot be used for forwarding and rule matching,
SICS also assigns a label to each encrypted packet to identify
the forwarding and rule-matching behaviors of the packet,
which reveals minimal information of in-cloud service chain-
ing. SICS leverages a novel data structure AP Classifier,
developed in our previous work [38], to support label as-
signment and dynamic updates, even in the context of ser-
vice chaining. To the best of our knowledge, this middlebox
outsourcing scheme is the first system that allows practical
in-cloud service function chaining that preserves private in-
formation of packet headers and rules and supports fast rule
updates. Compared to existing solutions, SICS has the fol-
lowing advantages.
1. Strong security guarantee. For each packet, only a
label is used to identify its rule-matching behaviors in the
cloud. No other information is exposed.
2. High-throughput processing at the enterprise side.
Before redirecting packets to the cloud, SICS allows the gate-
way of the enterprise to find the proper labels with high
throughput and little overhead.
3. Supporting fast rule update. The processing rules
of middleboxes may be modified frequently [32]. Moreover,
the elasticity of the cloud allows the number of middlebox
instances in the cloud to keep on varying to accommodate
incoming traffic, which avoids under-provision during peak
load and over-provision for base load [24]. SICS supports
fast rule updates both at the enterprises and in the cloud.
4. No extra traffic overhead. The ISP usually charges
the traffic redirected to the cloud by volume. SICS does not
increase the packet size.
To our knowledge, no prior work can satisfy all above re-
quirements.
Similar to Embark [28], SICS focuses on the privacy pro-
tection of packet headers and rules. It does not discuss how
to perform deep packet inspection (DPI) to encrypted pay-
loads. Existing solutions such as Blindbox [35] and GPSE
[37] are completely orthogonal to our work. SICS can be
combined with Blindbox to protect the private information
of all packet headers, payloads, and middlebox rules.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In §2, we
present related work. We introduce the system overview in
§3. We present detailed design of the enterprise side in §4
and that of the cloud side in §5. We show how SICS supports
frequent rule update in §6 and analyze its security guarantee
in §7. We present the implementation of SICS in §8 and
evaluation results in §9 before concluding in §10.
2. RELATED WORK
APLOMB [34] and Jingling [23] are the pioneer works of
middlebox outsourcing to the cloud. In particular, extensive
experiments were conducted in APLOMB to illustrate the la-
tency inflation due to outsourcing is negligible. As a parallel
work to APLOMB, Jingling focuses very much on the inter-
faces and inter-operations between the cloud and customers.
Both works do not take privacy issues into consideration.
Melis et al. [29] model the behaviors of common mid-
dleboxes and proposed a privacy preserving middlebox out-
sourcing scheme based on fully homomorphic encryption
[18]. Though fully homomorphic encryption is generic, the
poor performance impedes its use in practice. Focusing on
protecting the privacy of packet headers and middlebox rules,
the most closely related work to SICS is Embark [28]. Em-
bark uses a method called PrefixMatch to transform packet
headers to new IPv6 packet headers. For each header field,
Embark lays out all endpoints of prefixes or ranges on an
axis in ascending order. For all the intervals formed by each
consecutive pair of endpoints, Embark calculates the set of
prefixes each interval belongs to. Then Embark assigns an
encrypted prefix to each interval. Intervals pertaining to the
same set of prefixes receive the same encrypted prefix. Head-
ers of traffic also employ a per-field encryption. To en-
crypt a value, Embark first locates the interval and the cor-
responding IPv6 prefix the value falls in. After that, the
value is mapped to a pseudorandom IPv6 address that be-
longs to the encrypted prefix. PrefixMatch enables middle-
boxes running in the cloud to process encrypted packets with
encrypted rules. The main drawback of PrefixMatch is that it
does not support real-time updates. Since network dynamics
may occur before completing previous updates, PrefixMatch
may never achieve completely correct middlebox process-
ing. From a security perspective, a field-by-field encryption
scheme is vulnerable to brute-force attacks.
In a recent work, Splitbox [17] defines a network function
as a pair of a match function and an action function. The ac-
tion function is distributed to several virtual machines resid-
ing in multiple clouds or multiple servers in the same cloud.
Computation results from all virtual machines are collected
by a local middlebox and final actions of packets are calcu-
lated at the local middlebox. The assumption is that an ad-
versary cannot corrupt all virtual machines simultaneously.
This assumption does not hold when the attacker is the cloud
itself and cloud providers collude with each other. Match
functions are represented as wildcards in Splitbox. Hash
values of match functions and which field of the packet the
current match function corresponds to are provided to mid-
dleboxes running in the cloud. Middleboxes calculate hash
values of incoming packets and compare them with hash val-
ues of match functions to find a match. When the number of
valid bits (bits except wild card bits) of a match function is
small, it is easy for adversaries to perform brute-force at-
tacks to find pre-images.
3. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
In modern networks, most middleboxes choose proper pro-
cessing actions (e.g., dropping packets, rewriting packets, or
DPI) based on the headers of incoming packets. When a
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middlebox processes a packet, it finds a rule that matches
the packet header and follows the action of the rule. Hence,
rule information specifies packet processing policies of mid-
dleboxes. Both packet headers and rules contain private in-
formation of the owner of the enterprise network. How to
perform middlebox outsourcing without exposing the infor-
mation of packet headers and rules is a challenging problem.
To address this problem, we design and implement SICS, a
secure in-cloud service function chaining framework.
3.1 Outsourcing Architecture
We use a network function outsourcing architecture sim-
ilar to APLOMB [34], in which an enterprise redirects its
traffic to a third party cloud for network function process-
ing before transmitting them to the internal network or to
the Internet. We extend this model to support steering traf-
fic through the desired chains of middleboxes with privacy
protection.
The outsourcing architecture contains two parties: an en-
terprise and a third party cloud providing in-cloud network
functions. A local gateway sitting at the enterprise tunnels
both ingress and egress traffic of the enterprise to middle-
boxes running in the cloud. To prevent the cloud from ac-
cessing headers of the traffic, header fields of incoming pack-
ets are encrypted using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
and sent to the cloud. The in-cloud middleboxes process
packets based on encrypted headers and then transmitting
them back to the enterprise. Finally, the gateway decrypts
the packet and sending them to the internal network. To
enable correct rule-matching with encrypted headers, each
packet is assigned with a label. In the cloud, packets are for-
warded and processed based on their labels. When the enter-
prise communicates with an external site, the operations are
similar to those of incoming traffic: outgoing packets from
the enterprise are encrypted, sent to the cloud, and sent back
to the gateway, before being actually transferred over the In-
ternet. Note that an optimization that saves on bandwidth
and latency can be adopted when communications are be-
tween two networks belonging to a same enterprise or two
enterprises that has established a secure channel. After in-
cloud processing, the traffic can directly go to the destination
site without sending back since the same encryption key is
shared by the two networks.
3.2 Threaten Model
While an enterprise outsources its network functions for
decreased cost and ease of management, it brings a challenge
on the privacy of header and rule information.In our threaten
model, we assume the cloud to be “honest but curious” [25].
The cloud is honest to perform its services correctly. Traf-
fic in cloud is trusted to be forwarded and processed fol-
lowing the requests from the enterprise. However, the cloud
might be curious to learn processing policies at middleboxes
or look at the traffic going through. These data might be
sold by disgruntled cloud employees [5, 15] or stolen and ex-
posed by hackers [7, 1]. All of these potential threats impede
wide adoption of network function outsourcing. For net-
work function outsourcing, we propose three security prop-
erties: (1) The cloud should not learn plaintext of processing
rules at in-cloud middleboxes. (2) For encrypted packets, the
cloud should not be able to infer their packet headers based
on their in-cloud behaviors. (3) Unlike cryptographic hash
functions, label assignment of packet headers does not need
to be collision-resistant. In SICS, distinct packets can be as-
signed with the same label if they have identical behaviors
in the cloud. We assume that the gateway is hosted in the
enterprise and trusted. It does not leak information.
3.3 Middlebox Processing with
Label Matching
In SICS, packet headers are encrypted and hence can-
not be used for in-cloud forwarding and rule-matching. In-
stead, SICS assigns a label to each packet at the gateway.
Matching fields of the rule tables on in-cloud middleboxes
are also specified in labels. Labels of in-cloud middleboxes
are generated and deployed by the network operator at the
setup time. Adopting label-matching in SICS derives from
a combination of security and efficiency considerations, as
follows:
Protect the privacy of headers and rules. In our label-
matching scheme, packets are forwarded and processed through
in-cloud middleboxes in a sequence specified by service re-
quirements, based on their labels. Forwarding and rule-matching
behaviors of packets are completely determined by their la-
bels. We name all forwarding decisions and behaviors at
middleboxes as network-wide behaviors of packets. A set of
packets which have the same network-wide behaviors form
an equivalence class. In SICS, we assign the same label to
all packets belonging to the same equivalence class. Given
an encrypted packet with a label, its original packet header
cannot be obtained from the label. For example, there ex-
ists a packet header set S, packets whose headers are in S
share the same network-wide behaviors. A packet is as-
signed a label “10110110” if its header is in S. Here, the
label is an arbitrary 8 bits-long binary string. The length
of a label is determined by the total number of network-
wide behaviors. Each label only includes two types of infor-
mation: 1) which middlebox the packet should visit in the
cloud, and 2) which action a middlebox should apply to this
packet. Rule tables at in-cloud middleboxes are also filled
out with label-matching items. If the packet should be pro-
cessed by an intrusion detection system (IDS), then the rule
table of the IDS should contain a rule: “10110110, IDS”.
From label-matching tables at middleboxes, the cloud can-
not learn original middlebox policies with respect to packet
headers. Note the label-matching method provides minimal
information leakage. The label does not reveal any infor-
mation other than the packet behaviors of forwarding and
middlebox actions, which are known to the cloud no matter
what type of protection is used.
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Figure 1: Design framework
Enable efficient table lookup. From a system design per-
spective, label matching is ideal for service function Chain
outsourcing. Labels add little per packet overhead. In our
experiments, a 16-bits long label is enough to represent network-
wide behaviors in a network with one million 5-tuple rules.
The label can be placed at the options field in IPv4 proto-
col header without incurring extra overhead. In the rule-
matching process, header matching requires to support lookups
over hundreds of bits; in contrast, label matching needs only
match over some tens of bits. Using a proper designed hash
table, label matching can achieve O(1) lookup time without
special hardware such as TCAM. Further, label matching is
more flexible than header matching to support network pro-
tocol evolution (e.g.,IP addressing from IPv4 to IPv6) and
innovations (e.g.,more header fields are involved in match-
ing) which necessitates a change in the matching behavior
[20], especially when the cloud uses hardware forwarding
components.
While the use of label matching is not new in a general
networking, our specific contributions lie in the design of
header space mapping in the context of secure middlebox
outsourcing.
3.4 Design Framework
Fig. 1 shows the design framework of SICS. Modules in
the dashed box are rule preprocessing procedures running on
a server of the enterprise. Inputs are service function chain
specifications and processing rules at each middlebox. Ser-
vice function chains specify middlebox related processing
requirements for each kind of traffic. The output is an ab-
stract function network. The abstract function network con-
sists of all middleboxes required in service function chains
and a virtual switch connecting all middleboxes. Each mid-
dlebox has a rule table which specifies behaviors of packets
based on their labels. The virtual switch is equipped with
a forwarding table which determines next hops for packets
with different labels. Besides label and output port entry,
the forwarding table at the virtual switch has an extra en-
try classifying packets based on their input ports. The input
ports are used to identify the segment in the service function
chain that the packet is currently in. The result abstract func-
tion network should ensure that packets are processed by re-
quired middleboxes in a correct sequence. Packets should
not pass through middleboxes that are not required. The en-
terprise gateway hosts a tunnel between itself and the cloud.
It encrypts headers of incoming packets before redirecting
them to middleboxes running in the cloud through the tun-
nel. Headers are restored when packets return from the cloud
after service function chain processing. To address the func-
tionalities outlined above, we design three key modules in
SICS:
Rule composition: The rule composition module takes
service function chain requirements and middlebox process-
ing rules as input. It firstly combines certain service require-
ments to obtain overall middlebox processing sequences for
each set of packets. Based on processing requirements, it
generates forwarding rules at the virtual switch to steer pack-
ets across middleboxes. Finally, it uses rule composition al-
gorithms to composite rules at the virtual switch and middle-
boxes to a list of predicates. Each predicate specifies a set of
packet headers that has identical behaviors on a certain box
[38].
Header space mapping: The header space mapping mod-
ule takes the list of predicates from the rule composition
module as input. It calculates equivalence classes using the
predicates. Each equivalence class specifies a set of packet
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headers that has identical behaviors on all boxes. Hence an
equivalence class is the intersection of the packet sets speci-
fied by a number of predicates or the negation of predicates.
Each equivalence class is mapped to a label, which identifies
a set of packets belonging to the equivalence class.
Packet classification: The gateway maintains a packet
classifier which classifies packets to equivalence classes based
on their headers. When an equivalence class is found for a
given packet, the gateway assigns the label corresponding to
the equivalence class to the packet.
4. DESIGN OF ENTERPRISE GATEWAY
In this section, we describe design details of SICS enter-
prise gateway.
4.1 Rule Composition
A service function chain requires that a certain class of
packets should be processed by a number of middleboxes
in a designated sequence. For example, all HTTP packets
should go through IDS → Proxy. Packets from an inter-
nal site A should be processed by NAT→ Firewall. Special
considerations should be given on packets which are con-
strained by more than one service chain requirements. In
previous examples, if an HTTP packet comes from the site
A, it should traverse all middleboxes specified by both chains
above. Service function chains are formulated with respect
to a class of packets, specified by packet headers. A set of
headers can be represented as a predicate. Variables of the
predicate are packet header fields. A predicate P specifies
the set of packets for which P is true. SICS provides a tool
to convert packet sets in service function chain requirements
to predicates. Consider m processing requirements as the
following list:
S1,c1, p1;
S2,c2, p2;
...
Sm,cm, pm.
Let Si be the predicate specifying the set of packets in
the i th requirement. ci represents the sequence of middle-
box processing. pi is the priority. Requirements are listed
in descending order of priorities. The priority is necessary
to determine the order of middlebox processing when two
chains are combined. In the previous example, the priority
is used to determine the overall service function chain for an
HTTP packet from site A is IDS→ Proxy→ NAT→ Fire-
wall or NAT → Firewall → IDS → Proxy. To ensure that
packets are processed by all required middleboxes, we use
Algorithm. 1 to calculate overall service function chains for
each set of packets specified by a predicate.
The output of Algorithm. 1 is a list of predicates F and
service function chains for the packet sets specified by each
predicate. From the algorithm, we see that the conjunction
of any two predicates in F is equal to false (false refers to
Algorithm 1: Calculate overall service function chains.
Input : Sorted service function chain requirements
(Si,ci for i = 1, ...,m).
Output: A list of predicatesF = { f1, f2, ... fn} and
their overall function chains.
1 Done← f alse,F =∅, T1 =∅, T2 =∅
2 for i = 1 to m do
3 Si← Si∧¬Done, Done← Si∨Done
4 T1.add(Si), T2 =∅
5 for j = i to m do
6 for each f ∈T1 do
7 if f ∧S j = false then
8 T2.add( f )
9 else
10 T2.add( f ∧S j)
11 append S j’s chain c j to ( f ∧S j)’s chain
12 if f ∧¬S j 6= f alse then
13 T2.add( f ∧¬S j)
14 end
15 end
16 end
17 T1 =T2,T2 =∅
18 end
19 F .addall(T1)
20 end
21 ReturnF
an empty set), so packet sets specified by any two predicates
have no intersection.
Next, we fill out the forwarding table of the virtual switch
in the abstract function network using the output of Algo-
rithm. 1. To see how this works, we use an example as
shown in Fig. 2. Fig. 2(a) is an abstract function network
with three middleboxes. All middleboxes are connected by
a virtual switch with five ports. Three ports are used to
link middleboxes and the other two are ingress and egress
port. Fig. 2(b) shows three sample service function chains.
The class of packets in each chain is specified by an inte-
ger range. 1 Fig. 2(c) is the forwarding table at the virtual
switch that steers traffic across middleboxes according to the
service chains in Fig. 2(b). As the forwarding table has an
entry input port, we partition the forwarding table into sub-
tables, with each corresponds to an input port. From the
Fig. 2(c), we see that many items in each sub-tables share
the same output port. To reduce the size of each table, ranges
which have the same output port are merged. The result for-
warding table is shown in Fig. 2(d). The total items in the
forwarding table are reduced from 14 to 9. When packet sets
are represented as predicates, the merge operation can also
be efficiently executed by calculating disjunctions of BDDs.
1All packet sets are converted to predicates and represented by bi-
nary decision diagrams (BDDs) [19] in our implementation. Here
we use integer ranges for simplicity.
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Figure 2: (a) An abstract function network. (b) Service func-
tion chain requirements. (c) Original forwarding table. (d)
Composed forwarding table.
With predicate compositions, there exists at most one predi-
cate for an output port in each sub-table.
Typically, processing rules of middleboxes are generated
locally. We use Algorithm. 2 to compose rules of middle-
boxes before they are deployed in the cloud. We formulate
rules at middleboxes in the form: (Ri, pi,ai). Ri denotes the
predicate converted from the i th rule. pi is the priority. ai
specifies the behavior of packets matching this rule. We sort
all rules at a middlebox in descending order with respect to
priorities. When a packet is checked against rules at a mid-
dlebox, it is matched by the first rule whose predicate evalu-
ates to true for the packet. We use Algorithm. 2 to compute
a single predicate for each behavior at a middlebox. For a
simple example, packets at a firewall only have two possible
behaviors: be allowed or denied. Given the access control
list (ACL) of the firewall, we compute a single predicate that
specifies the packet set allowed by the ACL.
4.2 Header Space Mapping
Having obtained a list of predicates for each middlebox
as well as the virtual switch in the rule composition mod-
ule, we use these predicates to calculate equivalence classes
within a packet header space. From previous algorithms, we
see that the conjunction of any two predicates from the same
box is false while disjunction of all predicates is true. (We
have added a default predicate at each box.) Predicates from
a box can be seen as a partition which divides the packet
header space into several sub-spaces. For a middlebox, a
sub-space specifies a set of packets having a same behav-
ior at the middlebox. For the virtual switch, a sub-space
presents a packet set with a same forwarding output port. If
Algorithm 2: Calculate a predicate for each behavior.
Input : Rules at a middlebox
Output: A list of predicatesP = {P1,P2, ...Pn}
1 for i = 1 to j do
2 Pj← f alse
3 end
4 Done← f alse
5 for j = 1 to m do
6 if R j has a same behavior as Pi then
7 Pi← Pi∨ (Ri∧¬Done)
8 Done← Done∨Ri
9 end
10 end
11 ReturnP
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a1
a2
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⊕ =
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Figure 3: Header space divided by predicates
we place predicates from all boxes together, the partition of
the header space will become combinatorially finer due to
intersections of predicates from different boxes.
Fig. 3 shows an example illustrating the process of com-
bining predicates from two boxes. In this example, each
predicate is associated with two header fields. Five pred-
icates P1 ∼ P5 from two boxes are placed together in one
packet header space. Then the header space is partitioned
into fifteen blocks. Each block represents a set of headers
belonging to an identical set of predicates. That is, packet
headers within one block will match same predicates and
then have identical behaviors at all boxes. In §3.3, we define
network-wide behaviors of a packet as its overall forwarding
paths and behaviors at middleboxes in the network. So pack-
ets within one block of the header space have same network-
wide behaviors. Recalling the definition of the equivalence
class in §3.3, we can conclude that headers within one block
belong to the same equivalence class. Note that an equiva-
lence class is not necessarily continuous. As shown in Fig. 3,
the partition of fifteen blocks has six equivalence classes
a1 ∼ a6.
Given a list of predicates, we calculate its equivalence
classes using algorithms in [40]. The set of equivalence
classes has two key properties: (1) Packets within an equiv-
alence class have identical network-wide behaviors. That
is, these packets will traverse the same sequence of middle-
boxes and have same behaviors at each middlebox in the
network. (2) Each input predicate is equal to disjunctions
of a subset of equivalence classes. As shown in Fig. 3,
P1 = a1∨a4 and P5 = a3∨a4∨a5.
With these properties, it is intuitive to map the packet
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header space with respect to equivalence classes. We map
packet headers within an equivalence class to one label. The
label in our implementation is a binary string. The length of
the string is determined by the total number of equivalence
classes. A 16-bits long label can support a network with
up to 65536 equivalence classes, with each corresponds to
a unique network-wide behavior. In rule tables of in-cloud
boxes, a predicate P is represented as a set of labels. The
labels are determined by the subset of equivalence classes
whose disjunction is P.
4.3 Packet Classification
Before the gateway assigning labels to packets, we need to
figure out which equivalence class a given packet belongs to.
Equivalence classes are specified by predicates. A straight-
forward approach is to test the packet header against these
predicates linearly. However, this approach is slow. In our
experiments on the Stanford network [9], which has about
500 equivalence classes, only 20K queries per second was
achieved. To make SICS practical in service function chain
outsourcing, a challenge is to design a data structure that
could classify packets to their equivalence classes with a
high throughput. The data structure should not incur large
memory overhead at the enterprise. More importantly, it
should support real time update to deal with dynamics re-
sulting from middlebox load balancing or changing of pro-
cessing policies.
In SICS, we leverage algorithms in [38] and all predicates
obtained from the rule composition module to construct a
packet classifier. In the query process, the output of the
packet classifier is the equivalence class the given packet be-
longs to. With the rule composition, the total number of
input predicates is much smaller than the number of rules
from middleboxes and the virtual switch, which reduces the
time cost to construct the packet classifier. In our exper-
iments, the construction time of the packet classifier for a
ruleset with 100K rules is less than one second. With the
optimization technique in [38], the packet classifier can find
an equivalence class for a given packet by testing the packet
header against only tens of predicates. Further, as shown in
[38], the packet classifier can be updated in real-time with
very little overhead.
5. DESIGN OF IN-CLOUD MIDDLEBOXES
The goal of SICS is to protect the privacy of packet head-
ers and middleboxes processing rules. SICS can be used
to module middleboxes which determine packet behaviors
based on packet headers. We call these middleboxes as header-
related middleboxes (e.g., firewalls, NAT, and L4 load bal-
ancing). For middleboxes which also check other packet
fields, such as payload (e.g., proxies and IDSes), SICS can
be combined with recent works of secure DPI [35, 37].
To encrypt processing rules of middleboxes, the rule com-
position module has converted rules at each middlebox to a
list of predicates. With the property of equivalence classes,
each predicate is represented as a set of labels. At the en-
terprise gateway, a packet is assigned a label correspond-
ing to the equivalence class the packet belongs to. So an
in-cloud middlebox can determine the behavior of a packet
by searching its label against the label set of each predicate
to find a match. Next, we discuss header-related middle-
boxes in two categories: static middleboxes that do not mod-
ify packet headers and others work as header transformers
which rewrite some or all fields of packet headers.
Static middleboxes. Static middleboxes process pack-
ets without modifying headers. We can use one label for
a packet to identify its processing at all static middleboxes
it traverses. At a middlebox, labels determine packet behav-
iors. They are saved in the form of (Key,Value) pairs in a
hash table. A key represents a label and its value store the
behavior of packets with that label. If a middlebox finds a
match for the label of a packet, the behavior of the packet at
the middlebox is obtained.
For stateful middleboxes that record information about
connections, encrypted packet headers are used to distin-
guish flows with the same label.
Dealing with header transformers. When an in-cloud
middlebox modifies packet headers, behaviors of packets on
downstream boxes must be determined by their new headers.
In label-matching, the rest packet behaviors should be in-
structed by new labels. For example, when an internal packet
goes through a NAT, its source IP is modified to the external
IP of the NAT (The source port is changed randomly. The
randomly chosen source port does not influence packet be-
haviors, so it is not considered in assigning labels). The NAT
needs to assign a new label to the packet since the header of
the packet has been changed. However, it is hard for in-cloud
middleboxes to calculate new labels for packets they have
just modified. This is because labels are assigned to pack-
ets at the gateway based on all their header fields. To keep
the privacy, headers of packets are encrypted before they en-
ter the cloud. It is impossible for in-cloud middleboxes to
calculate labels for packets without knowing their headers.
Also, new modified header fields should be encrypted and
not be accessed by the cloud. So middleboxes which modify
packet headers need to assign new labels to packets without
learning both their original and new headers.
To address the problem above, we design a label-to-label
replacement strategy. In §4.2, we partition the header space
as a whole to equivalence classes. A packet is classified to an
equivalence class based on all its header fields. Nonetheless,
there also exists a partition along each field of the header
space. We call one part of the partition as a per-field equiva-
lence class. To illustrate this concept, we revisit the previous
example in Fig. 4 (a). The header space has six equivalence
classes, a1 ∼ a6. Along each field, the header space is also
partitioned into per-field equivalence classes. Along f ield1,
there are a11 ∼ a13. Along f ield2, there are a21 ∼ a25. A
property is that an equivalence class can be identified by a
set of per-field equivalence classes, with each took from one
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Field1
Field2
a1
a2
a6a3
a4
a5
a11 a12 a13
a21
a22
a23
a24
a25
Label a4                            Label a5
Label Action
a1 or a6 Modify the label to a2
a3 or a4 Modify the label to a5
Others Leave labels unchanged
(a) (b)
Figure 4: (a) Per-field equivalence class. (b) An example on
header modification.
field. In Fig. 4 (a), a4 can be identified by a12 and a24 and a5
can be identified by a12 and a22.
Based on the property of the per-field equivalence class,
a label replacement table can be produced for each equiv-
alence class when one header field is modified. As shown
in Fig. 4 (b), we assume that the function of the middlebox
is rewriting f ield2 of all incoming packets to a new value
v and the value v belongs to the per-field equivalence class
a22. We can get a label replacement table based on logical
relationships between equivalence classes as shown in Fig. 4
(b). For a packet with a label a4, the orange line shows its
behavior when it passes the middlebox. Its label is modified
to a5 since it matches the second line of the table. The rest
behaviors of the packet will be guided by the label a5. Note
that all contents of the label replacement table are generated
by the gateway and sent to the cloud at setup time.
Besides modifying labels, the middlebox assigns an index
from a header field pool to the packet. It receives these in-
dexes from the gateway at setup time. Each index is reserved
for a rewritten header field. When the gateway receives a
packet with such an index, it restores the rewritten header
fields.
6. UPDATE OPERATIONS
In-cloud middleboxes may experience bandwidth fluctu-
ations [22] and middlebox overload is a common cause of
failures [24, 34]. Thus, it necessary to balance the load
across middleboxes in real time. Moreover, service func-
tion chain requirements and processing rules of middleboxes
may need to be modified over time. All of these dynamics
results in rule updates at the virtual switch and middleboxes.
To keep the correctness and performance of the in-cloud
processing, it is necessary for a service function chain out-
sourcing framework to support real-time update. We use the
method presented in [40] to convert a rule insertion or dele-
tion to predicate changes. If there exist predicate changes
after a rule update, we perform the method presented below
to update both the gateway and in-cloud boxes.
6.1 Update at the Gateway
When a predicate is added or deleted, the update proce-
dure starts from updating the packet classifier at the gateway.
We use algorithms from [38] to execute the update. If equiv-
alence classes are changed by an update, the packet classifier
will start to classify packets to the new set of equivalence
classes after the update. Updates of the packet classifier can
be executed very fast. In our experiments, the average cost
of adding a predicate is less than 0.5 ms.
To figure out the influence of an update to existing pred-
icates, the gateway maintains a representation list for each
predicate. The list of a predicate includes all equivalence
classes whose disjunction is equal to the predicate. In the
previous example, the representation list of P5 is {a3,a4,a5}
and that for P2 is {a2,a5}. The table is adjusted dynamically
based on the current state of each predicate. An update may
result in modifications of multiple representation lists. When
the representation list of a predicate is modified, the gateway
sends update instructions to the source box of the predicate
running in the cloud.
6.2 Update in the Cloud
Predicate updates in the cloud are treated in four cases.
For the cases in which a new predicate P′ is added, we as-
sume that an existing equivalence class ai is partitioned into
two equivalence classes ai and ai′.
Case 1: Adding a new predicate P′ at a middlebox. We
firstly calculate the representation list of P′. For each equiv-
alence class in the representation list, we insert its label into
the hash table of the middlebox. Values inserted are the be-
havior identified by P′. For any predicate P whose represen-
tation list originally contains ai, we add a new equivalence
class ai′ into its list. Meanwhile, the label corresponding to
ai′ is inserted into the hash table of P’s source box in the
cloud, the value is P’s behavior.
Case 2: Deleting an existing predicate P at a middlebox.
Labels corresponding to equivalence classes in the represen-
tation list of P are deleted from the hash table of the middle-
box. No other operations are needed.
Case 3: Adding a new predicate P′ at the virtual switch.
Similar as in case 1, labels corresponding to P′ and modifica-
tions for other predicates are inserted. Adding a new predi-
cate at the virtual switch happens in two scenarios: a) A new
middlebox processing is inserted into the service function
chain, packets are forwarded to the new middlebox before
they are processed by the rest of function chain; b) To bal-
ance the load, instead of being processed by the specified
middlebox, a portion of traffic is rerouted to a new middle-
box of the same function. In case (a), the new added pred-
icate P′ is marked as “new”. Packets matching P′ will not
change input ports and continue their service chain after be-
ing processed by the middlebox identified by P′. In case (b),
the new added predicate P′ is treated as a normal predicate.
Case 4: Deleting an existing predicate P at the virtual
switch. Similar as in case 2, labels corresponding to P are
deleted. The deleted predicate P is marked as “deleted”. In-
coming ports of packets matching P are changed to the port
determined by P instantly without actually being forwarded
to the middlebox.
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Note that, for stateful middleboxes, states recorded will
not be disturbed in updating since we distinguish flows using
their encrypted header fields.
6.3 Maintain the Consistency
Rule updates need to be treated carefully. Inconsistent
state between the gateway and boxes in the cloud may lead
to incorrect middlebox processing.
To maintain per-packet consistency, we buffer packets at
the gateway when there come updates. The gateway in-
stalls updates as in §6.1. Then the gateway calculates update
schemes for boxes involved and sends update messages to
the cloud. Upon receiving update instructions, boxes in the
cloud finish processing all ongoing packets in the pipeline
before installing updates. After that, the gateway begins to
process new packets.
To maintain flow consistency, we employ the migration
avoidance mechanism in [31]. New flows are steered to new
middlebox instances while existing flows still processed by
old ones. Additionally, a lookup table recording previous
flows and their labels are maintained at the gateway. Incom-
ing packets search the lookup table before querying the gate-
way. If a match occurs, a packet belonging to a current con-
nection will always be assigned the same label. An item in
the lookup table is removed if the connection is terminated.
7. SECURITY GUARANTEE
In SICS, prefixes and ranges from middlebox processing
rules are converted to a list of predicates. Then each pred-
icate is represented as a set of labels. Labels are used as
matching fields to enable in-cloud functionalities. Labels do
not leak size, order or border of predicates. Also, the cloud
cannot learn which field of the packet header a matching cor-
responding to. SICS encrypts packet headers and assigns
a label to each packet to identify its in-cloud processing.
Given an encrypted packet with a label, its original packet
header cannot be reversed from the label. For any two pack-
ets that are assigned the same label, the cloud only learns that
the two packets have same in-cloud behaviors, but it cannot
learn any other information about their orders or values.
Next, we compare the security of SICS with the Prefix-
Match in Embark [28] under a brute force attack. We as-
sume that an attacker (e.g., cloud itself or a hacker) selec-
tively sends sample packets to the gateway and observes
their in-cloud behaviors, trying to figure out the plaintext
of rules at a middlebox. PrefixMatch adopts a per-field en-
cryption scheme. Prefixes or ranges for each header field are
encrypted separately. For an encrypted prefix or range, the
attacker knows which field of the packet header the prefix
or range corresponding to. He can obtain the plaintext of
the encrypted prefix or range by traversing the entire search
space of that field.
An example attack is as following: for the destination port
field in IPv4 header, PrefixMatch encrypts a port number in-
terval [s,e] to a random interval [S,E]. All port numbers
Encrypted Packets
Plaintext 
packets
Processing 
Requirements
Admin
Control 
Layer
Click
Adapter
Tunnel 
Layer
Ingress
Egress
Set up and Update
Gateway Cloud
Amazon VPC
Figure 5: Software architecure
falling in [s,e] are encrypted to values in [S,E]. Knowing
the interval [S,E], it takes an attacker at most 216 queries
(e.g., sample packets with destination port traversing from 0
to 216) to find all port numbers in [s,e], where 16 is the length
of the port field. So the attacker has successfully deciphered
the encrypted interval [S,E] in the cloud. In addition, when a
future packet matches the interval [S,E], the attacker learns
that the original destination port of the packet falls in [s,e].
Similarly, the attacker could get mapping relationships for
other fields. As a chosen packet header can test each header
field simultaneously, the number of required queries to de-
cipher all header fields is determined by the length of the
longest header field. For five tuples, the longest header field
is 32 bits. So it takes at most 232 quires to decipher a five-
tuple based ruleset encrypted using PrefixMatch.
As described in §4.2, SICS encrypts packet header fields
as a whole. That is, all packet header fields are involved
in the header space mapping process, the label of a packet
is determined by all bits of its header. To launch the same
attack described above, it costs 2104 queries which is much
larger than 232 .
8. IMPLEMENTATION
We built a prototype of SICS using middleboxes running
in Amazon Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) [2] and a gateway
running on a general purpose desktop computer in the au-
thors’ lab. We only use off-the-shelf components provided
by existing cloud and end hosts. This makes our design easy
to deploy and use.
Fig. 5 shows the software architecture of SICS. The gate-
way sitting at the enterprise consists of two layers: a con-
trol layer and a tunnel layer. The control layer takes service
function chain requirements and processing rules of middle-
boxes as input to calculate an abstract function network. The
abstract function network indicates the total number of re-
quired middleboxes and set up configurations of each mid-
dlebox. The control layer also maintains a packet classifier
which classifies packets from the tunnel layer to different la-
bels. When dynamics happen, the control layer updates the
packet classifier in real time. Simultaneously, it calculates
necessary updates in the cloud. We wrote scripts at the con-
trol layer to send batched instructions of both setting up and
updates to middleboxes running in the cloud.
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2(a) An abstract function network
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(b) Deployment in Amazon VPC
Firewall
Label Action
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Label Dst. IP
a1, a2 10.0.0.86
* 10.0.0.36
Figure 6: Example to convert an abstract function network
to in-cloud deployment
The tunnel layer hosts packet manipulation, header en-
cryption and VPN tunnels connecting remote instances in
the cloud. The tunnel layer receives plaintext packets from
customer networks. It adds labels assigned by the control
layer on packets. Our current implementation adds a 16-bits
long label into the options field of an IPv4 header. Then,
header fields of packets are encysted using symmetric en-
cryption (e.g., AES) . For tunnels, we use OpenVPN [13], a
widely-deployed VPN solution working under most opera-
tion systems. Encrypted packets are sent out through tunnels
using static routes.
At the cloud side, the abstract function network obtained
by the control layer of the gateway can be easily converted
into practical deployment in Amazon VPC. Amazon VPC
provides a virtual network of EC2 instances. Packets can
be transmitted between instances in a VPC using Layer-3
forwarding. Our deployment in the VPC has an ingress in-
stance, an egress instance, and other instances, each corre-
sponds to a middlebox. The ingress/egress instance hosts a
tunnel endpoint and forwards packets from and to middle-
boxes running in the cloud. To enable in-cloud packet for-
warding, we add an adapter layer at each EC2 instance to en-
capsulates and decapsulate incoming and outgoing packets.
The adapter layer sits between ethernet devices and Linux
kernel network stack which minimizes modifications to cur-
rent middleboxes. Before a packet is processed by a mid-
dlebox, the adapter layer removes its ethernet and outermost
IP header. After the middlebox processing, the adapter layer
encapsulates the packet with new headers which guides the
packet to its next required middlebox processing based on its
label. With the abstract function network, the adapter layer
learns the next required middlebox processing of a packet by
searching its label against the forwarding table of the virtual
switch in the abstract function network. As shown in Fig. 2,
the forwarding table is partitioned into sub-tables with re-
spect to input ports. For the adapter layer at a middlebox,
it can get new headers of packets by only searching for the
sub-table corresponding to the middlebox. Fig. 6 presents
an example of converting an abstract function network into
practical in-cloud deployment. Fig. 6 (a) is an example ab-
stract function network with three middleboxes. For sim-
plicity, only the rule table and the forwarding sub-table cor-
responding to a firewall are given. As shown in Fig. 6 (b), the
abstract function network is converted to a VPC subnet con-
sisting of five EC2 instances. For the firewall, its rule table
is obtained directly from the one in the abstract function net-
work. The adapter lookup table at the firewall derives from
the forwarding sub-table which has its input port equals to 1.
From this table, we see that packets with label a1,a2 should
be forwarded to port 3 which corresponds to a proxy. Other
packets are forwarded to port 4 which is the egress. In the
practical deployment, packets with label a1,a2 are encapsu-
lated with the proxy’s private IP 10.0.0.86 as their destina-
tion IP addresses. Other packets are encapsulated with IP
10.0.0.36 which corresponds to the egress.
For middlebox processing, we use Click [27], a customized
modular router. We build Click elements to perform a fire-
wall and a NAT. The only part that needs to be modified is
the matching process of middleboxes’ rule tables. We have
implemented a label-matching element using Cuckoo hash
table [30, 21]. The Cuckoo hash table stores (Key,Value)
pairs with a key representing a label and a value indicating
behaviors of packets with that label.
9. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We evaluate the performance of SICS. We first present the
performance of the gateway (§9.1). Then we analyze band-
width overhead due to the encryption scheme in SICS (§9.2).
Finally, we demonstrate SICS’s in-cloud performance, dy-
namic scaling capability and its resilience to middlebox fail-
ures (§9.3). The gateway is built on a general purpose desk-
top computer with quadore@3.2G and 16GB memory. It
redirects traffic from another machine with the same model.
For most experiments, we use a synthetic workload gener-
ated by the Pktgen [14]. We use data plane states from two
real networks [10] and [9] as starting points to create service
function chain requirements and rulesets at middleboxes. In
our experiments, all policies are based on five tuples (Source
IP, Source Port, Destination IP, Destination Port, Protocol).
9.1 Gateway
We first evaluate the performance of the gateway. We
compare with PrefixMatch in Embark [28] implemented by
us.
Construction time. Fig. 7 shows construction time of
the gateway with the size of ruleset increasing from 100K to
1000K. The construction time in SICS includes time cost of
rule composition, computing equivalence classes and con-
struction of the packet classifier. In Embark, it is the time
cost to construct the data structure for PrefixMatch. The
PrefixMatch in Embark works only on one header field, so
PrefixMatch needs to be run for each header field one after
another. In Fig. 7, we see that the time cost of PrefixMatch
in Embark is at least 5 times larger than SICS for all six rule
set sizes. The reason lies in the facts that the total number of
sub-intervals for each header field in PrefixMactch is much
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Figure 7: Construction time as # of rules increases.
larger than the number of equivalence classes in SICS. In our
experiments, the Internet2 data set which has approximately
70K rules produces 216 equivalence classes. The number
of sub-intervals calculated using PrefixMatch is more 9000.
This makes the process to find intervals pertaining to the
same set of prefixes in PrefixMatch very inefficient, espe-
cially when the size of the ruleset is large. As shown in
Fig. 7, constructing of the gateway in SICS only uses 383.7
ms for the ruleset with 100K rules. It is still less than 20 s
when the size of the ruleset increases to 1000K.
Table 1: Construction time of the gateway.
Size of
the Ruleset
(K)
Rule
Composition
(ms)
Computing
Equivalence
Classes (ms)
Constructing
Packet
Classifier (ms)
100 315.4 14.9 53.4
200 1118.3 15.2 83.2
400 2984.5 22.4 129.0
600 7125 25.2 148.2
800 9474.3 30.5 249.8
1000 17168.4 41.3 313.9
Next, we investigate time cost of each phase in gateway
construction separately. As shown in Table. 1, rule com-
position accounts for most of the overhead while comput-
ing equivalence classes and classifier construction can be
finished in tens of millisecond. When the size of the rule-
set increases, rule composition costs more time since more
rules are involved in the computation. However, the number
of predicates and equivalence classes do not increase much
since there usually exists large amounts of redundancy as
well as similarity between rules at middleboxes [39]. So the
time used to compute equivalence classes and construct the
packet classifier do not increase significantly. Note that the
gateway in SICS needs to be constructed for only once at
setup time. After that, the packet classifier can be updated
incrementally when there exist rule changes.
Real-time update of the packet classifier. In this set of
experiments, we first construct the packet classifier using a
subset of predicates and then keep adding new predicates.
We measure the time cost to add each predicate and update
the packet classifier. Fig. 8 shows the distribution of time
cost for adding a predicate for the ruleset with the number of
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rules increasing from 100K to 1000K. From the figure, we
see that the medium cost for adding a predicate does not have
oblivious differences when the size of ruleset increases. It is
less than 0.5 ms for all rulesets. The worst case may take
2-2.5 ms when the size of the ruleset is large. Deleting a
predicate does not require extra computation, hence there is
no result for deletions.
PrefixMatch in Embark may need to be reconstructed when
a rule update happens. So the time cost of a rule update is the
same as its construction cost, which can be approximately
100 s. Since network dynamics may occur during the recon-
struction, PrefixMatch may never achieve completely correct
middlebox processing.
Query throughput. In this set of experiments, we mea-
sure the query throughput of the gateway in SICS, in a num-
ber of queries per second (qps). Packets used for queries
in the experiments are generated randomly with respect to
equivalence classes. Results for each ruleset are shown in
Fig. 9. Since the PredixMatch in Embark can support only
one header field. Incoming packets need to query for each
packet header field sequentially. From the figure, we see that
the gateway in SICS can achieve 3.92 Mqps for the ruleset
with 100K rules. For the largest ruleset with 1000K rules,
the query throughput is 1.5 Mqps. For all rulesets, query
throughput of the gateway in SICS is higher than that in Em-
bark by approximately 20%.
Memory usage. Fig. 10 shows the memory usage of the
gateway. The gateway in SICS does not store rules. Instead,
we only store predicates calculated by the rule composition
module. Predicates are represented as BDDs in our imple-
mentation. For each predicate, we maintain a representation
list recording a subset of equivalence classes and their corre-
sponding labels whose disjunction is equal to the predicate.
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Each equivalence class is represented as a set of pointers to
predicates which contain the equivalence class. For in Em-
bark, we only calculate the memory cost of the data structure
for PrefixMatch. As shown in Fig. 10, the gateway in SICS
use less memory than Embark for all rule sets. The memory
usage for 100K rules is 0.267 MB and it increases to 0.349
MB when the ruleset becomes 10 times larger. The gateway
costs very small memory and can be stored in the cache.
9.2 Bandwidth Overheads
We evaluate the bandwidth overhead due to SICS encryp-
tion. In Embark, the PrefixMatch increases the amount of
data sent to the cloud by 20-bytes per packet (IPv4 to IPv6
conversion). Compared with Embark, the encryption scheme
in SICS does not incur extra bandwidth overheads on pack-
ets. In our implementation, we use 16 bits to encode la-
bels. A 16-bits long label can support up to 65536 equiv-
alence classes (network-wide behaviors) which are enough
for a middle-sized enterprise network. As reported in [40],
Stanford backbone network which contains 757170 forward-
ing rules has 494 network-wide behaviors. For middleboxes
which modify packet headers, we use another 16 bits as iden-
tifiers in a header fields pool to identify rewritten header
fields. Summing up above, the total number of bits we use in
our encryption scheme is 32 bits which can be placed in the
options field of IPv4 protocol header. So for each packet, no
extra bandwidth overhead is added.
9.3 In-cloud Middleboxes
In this set of experiments, we evaluate the performance
of our label-matching based middleboxes in the cloud. We
develop middleboxes using Click modular router. The label-
matching Click element is implemented as a (2,4)-Cuckoo
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Figure 12: Response time in the case of a middlebox failure
and traffic overload.
hash table which uses 64 KB memory. Keys are 16-bits
long labels. Their corresponding values indicate behaviors
of packets with these labels.
Query throughput of label-matching. We compare the
query throughput of label-matching with two built-in ele-
ments in Click: Click Classifier and Click Filter. Click Clas-
sifier classifies packets based on patterns of packet headers.
Click Filter denies or permits packets based on five tuples of
packet headers. Fig. 11 shows the experimental results with
the number of rules on the middlebox increasing from 2000
to 10000. The y axis is the lookup throughput in thousand
of queries per second (log scale). From the figure, we see
that label-matching can achieve about 8M queries per sec-
ond, which is larger than Click Filter and Click Classifier by
about two orders of magnitude.
Reacting to middlebox failure and overload. We con-
sider two dynamic scenarios: 1) a middlebox fails and 2)
traffic overload at a middlebox. We measure the reacting
time of SICS for each scenario. Results are shown in Fig. 12.
When a middlebox fails, we need to migrate the state of the
failure middlebox to a new instance and reconfigure the net-
work to steer packets with certain labels to the new instance.
For traffic overload at a middlebox, besides middlebox state
migration, we need to add new predicates to reroute a por-
tion of traffic on the current middlebox to another middle-
box. This further requires updating the packet classifier and
representation lists at the gateway. From the Fig. 12, we see
that the overall time to react to middlebox failure and traf-
fic overload is low (several milliseconds) and it costs a little
more time to deal with middlebox overload than failures.
10. CONCLUSION
SICS is a middlebox outsourcing system that protects the
private information of packet headers and middlebox rules.
Compared to existing methods, SICS has several unique ad-
vantages including stronger security guarantee, high-throughput
processing at both enterprise and cloud sides, and support of
fast update. SICS assigns each packet a label identifying
its matching behaviors in a service chain and all middlebox
processing in the cloud will be based on labels. We use pro-
totype implementation and evaluation on Amazon VPC and
local computers to show the feasibility, high performance,
and efficiency of SICS.
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